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Abstract 
In 2010, Maryland became the first state to allow firms to incorporate as “benefit 
corporations,” which are for-profit entities with a social purpose.  Since then, nineteen other 
states have followed.  Using survey data from the population of 94 benefit corporations existent 
at the time of the survey, this paper directly measures the “social responsibility discount” –  the 
degree to which investors in a benefit corporation have a lower required return on equity than 
they would have for traditional firms. This paper finds that the discount is approximately 35%.  
This paper also provides unique descriptive statistics about benefit corporations and their 
founders. 
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I. Introduction 
In corporate finance, maximization of shareholder wealth is generally assumed to be the 
goal of managers.  This goal is quite convenient, since it is easily measured – and allows 
managerial performance to be evaluated in an unambiguous way.  In 2010, however, the State of 
Maryland made this process more complicated by passing legislation that allows firms to 
incorporate as benefit corporations.  These new entities are very similar in most ways to 
traditional for-profit corporations, except they each have a social purpose explicitly enshrined in 
their articles of incorporation.  Thus, corporate social responsibility is a mandate for them, even 
if it is at the expense of profits.  The advent of this new corporate entity-type that is integrated 
with a corporate social responsibility (CSR) mandate may be considered the next logical step in 
the rapid growth in attention to social responsibility for businesses, both domestically and 
internationally (Galema, Plantinga, & Scholtens, 2008; Harjoto & Jo, 2011). 
  
Of course, this new development in corporate structure (and governance) makes the 
evaluation of managerial performance much less clear-cut.  Investors in benefit corporations can 
be assumed to have dual requirements - financial return on their investment as well as psychic 
benefits related to the fulfillment of the firm’s social purpose.  Since the psychic benefits provide 
utility to the investor, there must be a value associated with them.  In other words, the investor in 
a benefit corporation must be willing to accept a lower rate of financial return than he or she 
would for an investment in a traditional firm.  This paper identifies that difference as the social 
responsibility discount, with the obvious implication that the cost of equity capital is lower for 
benefit corporations. 
 
So how much is the social responsibility discount?  Using detailed survey responses from 
benefit corporation investors in eight states, it is clear that there is a wide range of perspectives 
regarding how much of the required financial return is replaced by social impact.  If fact, the 
survey responses spanned the entire possible range – from 0% (meaning the investor would not 
be willing to accept any return less than that of a traditional corporation) to 100% (meaning that 
the investor required no return at tall.  The mean, however, was thirty-five percent, which for 
example, would mean that if a traditional corporation had a required return of 10%, then the 
equivalent benefit corporation would have a required return of 6.5%. 
 
This paper adds to the corporate finance and entrepreneurial finance literature by 
estimating the discount factor by which to reduce the required return on equity for this new type 
of corporate entity.  This information is quite useful for valuation purposes.  It also adds to the 
body of knowledge by providing many descriptive demographic statistics about benefit 
corporations and their founders.  Until now, very little was known about these entities and the 
entrepreneurs behind them. 
 
Section II provides background about the history and nature of benefit corporations as 
well as the relevant literature concerning the intersection of cost of capital with corporate social 
responsibility.  Section III discusses the survey data and resulting variable definitions.  Section 
IV provides the analytical results and descriptive statistics.  Section V concludes. 
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II. Background 
II.a  Benefit Corporations 
Maryland was the first state to enact legislation authorizing benefit corporations on April 
13, 2010.  The statute in Maryland was modeled after the boilerplate legislation suggested by the 
founders of B-Lab, a Pennsylvania non-profit firm that provides CSR certification services to 
firms that wish to demonstrate sustainability to or social responsibility to customers.  The statute 
allows new firms to incorporate as the entity type “Benefit Corporation” (hereafter in this article 
referred to as a “bencorp”) or existing firms can switch to the new entity type with a two-thirds 
vote of the shareholders.  The law requires that each bencorp shall have the purpose of creating a 
public benefit, which may include any of the following: 
 
 Providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial 
products or services. 
 Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of 
jobs in the normal course of business. 
 Preserving the environment. 
 Improving human health. 
 Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge. 
 Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose. 
 Conferring any other particular benefit on society or the environment. 
 
It is important to recognize that these bencorps are FOR-profit firms.  The difference is 
that in addition to seeking profits, they also have some other “higher” purpose.  The idea is that 
officers and directors  of these bencorps are not required, either explicitly or implicitly, to pursue 
shareholder wealth maximization to the exclusion of all other goals and constituencies.  In fact, 
the legislation actually requires directors to consider the impacts of their actions on the following 
constituencies: 
 
 The shareholders of the benefit corporation. 
 The employees and work force of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and its 
suppliers. 
 The interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public benefit or specific public 
benefit purposes of the benefit corporation. 
 Community and societal factors, including those of each community in which offices or 
facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its suppliers are located. 
 The local and global environment. 
 
The statute also includes a requirement that the bencorp be assessed under a third-party 
standard for corporate, social and environmental performance.  Coincidentally, the original 
promoters of this legislation provide assessments such as this.  There are already actually several 
organizations that would be qualified to perform these assessments, including B-Lab, Ceres, and 
GRI.  The bencorp is then required to post the assessment results on their website within 120 
days of fiscal year end (Maryland Senate Bill 690, 2010).  Nineteen other states have also 
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enacted benefit corporation legislation, or something essentially equivalent.  Figure 1 contains a 
list of benefit corporation states and the relevant dates. 
 
 
State Bill Status Date 
    
Maryland HB1009 Approved by Governor 4/13/2010 
Vermont S0263 Approved by Governor 5/19/2010 
New Jersey S2170 Approved by Governor 3/1/2011 
Virginia HB2358 Approved by Governor 3/26/2011 
Hawaii SB 298 Approved by Governor.  Called Sustainable 
Business Corporations. 
7/8/2011 
California AB361 Approved by Governor 10/9/2011 
New York S00079 Approved by Governor 12/12/2011 
Washington HB2239 Approved by Governor. Called Social Purpose 
Corporations.  Third-party CSR standard is 
only required if included in articles of 
incorporation. 
3/30/2012 
Louisiana HB1178 Approved by Governor (Effective 8/1/2012) 5/31/2012 
South Carolina S1405 Approved by Governor (Effective 6/12/2012) 6/12/2012 
Illinois SB2897 Approved by Governor 8/2/2012 
Pennsylvania HB1616 Approved by Governor 10/24/2012 
District of 
Columbia 
B19-0584 Approved by Mayor 2/8/2013 
Arkansas HB1510 Approved by Governor 4/19/2013 
Arizona SB1238 Approved by Governor 4/30/2013 
Colorado HB13-1138 Approved by Governor 5/15/2013 
Nevada AB89 Approved by Governor 5/24/2013 
Oregon SB144 Approved by Governor 6/4/2013 
Delaware SB47 Approved by Governor 7/13/2013 
Rhode Island HB5720 Approved by Governor 7/17/2013 
 
Figure 1 - State-by-State Benefit Corporation Adoption 
 
 
There is an important semantic point to be made in this paper.  There has been confusion 
in the media and marketplace between the terms “benefit corporation” and “b-corp.”  They are 
two entirely different things, which is why I use the term “bencorp” in this paper as the 
abbreviated term for benefit corporation.  “B-Corp” is a trademarked term used by the non-profit 
company B-Lab to describe companies that are clients of theirs that have received the B-Lab 
CSR certification.  The B-Lab directors have also been the significant driver of lobbying to the 
individual state governments to pass benefit corporation legislation.  Hence the confusion.  In a 
nutshell, “b-corp” is a private CSR certification, whereas “benefit corporation” (or bencorp) is a 
legal entity type.  A bencorp can also be a b-corp – if they hire B-Lab to certify them. 
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Figure 2 - Benefit Corporations by State.  This figure represents the entire population of firms incorporating as 
benefit corporations in each state as of 5/31/2012. 
 
Historically, legislation is proposed and enacted in order to solve a legal problem that 
existing law does not adequately address.  So what problem is bencorp legislation attempting to 
resolve?  This question is answered in the white paper that proposed the idea of benefit 
corporation legislation. 
 
“For-profit companies pursuing a social mission face increasing difficulty as they 
scale; as officers and directors of these entities consider investments, mergers or 
liquidity events, the default position tends to favor the traditional fiduciary 
responsibility to maximize returns to shareholders over the company’s social 
mission. Many leaders of early and growth-stage mission-driven businesses fear 
being pressured to change business practices or pursue strategic alternatives to 
independent growth by investors whose financial interests often diverge over time 
from the social mission of the company. Whatever the letter of the law, these 
fears, combined with both prevailing business culture and advice of counsel about 
the risk of litigation if one fails to maximize shareholder value, have a chilling 
effect on corporate behavior as it relates to pursuit of a social mission.” (Clark & 
Vranka, 2012) 
 
The authors of the white paper appear to recognize (via usage of the phrase “Whatever 
the letter of the law”) that there may not be an actual legal danger to officers and directors for 
pursuing a social purpose at the expense of maximizing shareholder wealth.  There is little 
unambiguous evidence of this danger in existing case law.  On the contrary, officers of 
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corporations appear to have a great deal of latitude in what actions they take in pursuit of the 
goals of the firm (Underberg, 2012). 
 
The idea of establishing for-profit companies with an overriding social purpose did not 
originate with benefit corporations.  Muhammad Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank of 
Bangladesh, proposed a very similar structure.  He put forward the idea of entrepreneurs that 
would compete against all other firms in the marketplace, but be guided by a social objective.  
Personal profit would be encouraged, but subordinate to the social purpose.  And finally, there 
would be an objective way to measure the social impact of the firm and thus establish a rating for 
the social enterprises (Yunus, 1999, p. 251). 
II.b  Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) 
The premise of this article is that benefit corporations, since they have a social purpose in 
addition to shareholder wealth maximization, cater to a particular class of equity investors, which 
I will call social investors.  Furthermore, since social investors receive a psychological benefit 
from investing in firms that promote a favored social purpose, they should require a lower return 
on equity than a traditional investor would. 
 
The study of this phenomenon is somewhat problematic, since traditional pricing models 
such as CAPM make the assumption that all investors agree about the probability distribution of 
each firm’s expected payoff, and then make their investment decisions based on those 
distributions.  Social investors defy this model by taking other factors into consideration.  Fama 
and French (2007) posit that equity ownership in social enterprises may be viewed as a 
consumption good, subject to tastes, since investors receive utility that is non-pecuniary.  This 
taste for SRI assets could therefore create an arbitrage opportunity, due to the prices of SRI 
assets being bid up by social investors, followed by commensurate under-performance.  Unlike 
disagreement about distribution of expected returns, which causes a temporary price effect (until 
the actual distribution is revealed over time), differences in tastes cannot be assumed to be 
temporary, thus there may be a more permanent price effect (Fama & French, 2007). 
 
There is substantial empirical evidence that social beliefs impact investment holdings, 
and thus affect prices and returns.  Hong and Kacperczyk (2006) find that the avoidance of sin 
stocks by norm-constrained investors may be the cause of underpricing of those stocks, rather 
than any intrinsic qualities of those stocks.  This neatly aligns with Becker (1957), who posits a 
discrimination model that it should be costly for an agent to limit themselves to business dealings 
with certain types of people.  This model could clearly be extended to SRI, where investors limit 
their equity purchases to firms that adhere to certain social purposes.  The penalty for investing 
in SRI funds has been measured as between 3 and 30 basis points per month. (Geczy, 
Stambaugh, & Levin, 2005) 
 
Investment discrimination has been shown to be sensitive to political affiliation.  Far left 
voters are between seventeen and twenty percent less likely to own equities than right-wing 
voters.  The explanation put forth is that there may be a cognitive dissonance between the 
personal values of left-wing voters and the stock market in general (i.e. corporations are 
inherently evil). This isn’t just an income effect, where rich republicans are more likely to own 
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stocks than poor working-class democrats.  The empirical findings are robust to controls for 
education, wealth and income (Kaustia & Torstila, 2011). 
 
The political investment biases are not limited to amateur investors.  The portfolios of 
professional investment managers who are donors to the Democratic party are underweighted in 
non-SRI stocks.  Intuitively, SRI funds are more likely to be controlled by democrats. So the 
authors also control for fund and manager characteristics, and the results still hold (Hong & 
Kostovetsky, Red and blue investing: Values and finance, 2012) 
 
Aversion to financial markets in general appears to be influenced by whether or not the 
individual investor’s party is currently in power.  When the investor’s own political party is in 
power, he or she perceives the market to be either less risky or more undervalued.  Thus the 
investor is more likely to take financial risks (Bonaparte, Kumar, & Page, 2012).  This 
phenomenon is consistent with the idea that comfort level with investing is associated with the 
level of trust between the investor and the markets. It has been demonstrated that in communities 
with high levels of trust (aka social capital), there is more credit available and more investment 
in equities.   Thus, within the fellowship of corporate social responsibility (CSR) advocates, 
individuals that are typically averse to equity investment may be enticed to jump in, assuming 
the target firm is like-minded and therefore a member of the same trust community (Guiso, 
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2000).  They find that these effects of trust are higher among less educated 
people.  An equity investor receives little protection, and since the entire investment is at risk, he 
only invests in firms that he trusts. 
 
In another paper, using a probit analysis with dummy for direct stock ownership as 
dependent variable, the same authors find that trusting others increases the probability of the 
investor participating in the stock market by 6.5 percentage points.  They also find that stock 
investing increases with education and wealth, but decreases with age (Guiso, Sapienza, & 
Zingales, Trusting the Stock Market, 2008). 
 
Although there is theoretical support for both underperformance and outperformance of 
SRI, the actual empirical tests have been ambiguous thus far.  For example, from 1990-98, the 
Domini Social Index (DSI), a stock index of socially responsible firms, slightly outperformed the 
S&P 500 in raw returns, but was more volatile. Thus, after adjusting the DSI returns for risk, 
there was no significant difference between it and the S&P 500. (Statman, 2000) 
 
II.c.  Cost of Equity Capital 
 
This paper departs in major ways from other research regarding the cost of capital for 
socially responsible companies.  First and foremost, I do not attempt to directly estimate the cost 
of capital.  Rather, the purpose of this paper is to estimate the discount in the cost of capital, or in 
other words, how much less investors in benefit corporations require in financial return.  
Previous research has used public company data to calculate the implied cost of equity in variety 
of ways; using residual earnings and book values (Claus & Thomas, 2001), Forecasted return on 
equity (Gebhardt, Lee, & Swaminathan, 2001), the price-earnings-growth model (Easton, 2004), 
and forecasted earnings per share using a variation of the Gordon Growth Model (Ohlson & 
Juettner-Nauroth, 2005).  Hail and Leuz (2006) and El Ghoul et al. (2011) use all four of these 
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models to calculate the implied cost of equity.  El Ghoul et al. 2011, in a process that is very 
relevant to this paper, go on to regress implied cost of capital against CSR variables and find a 
significantly negative relationship.  Unfortunately, this paper could not duplicate any of these 
approaches to calculate the cost of equity since the benefit corporation sample had no public 
companies and therefore no stock prices. 
 
Of course the nature of expected returns of social enterprises is critical to the formation 
of the investors’ idea of required return on equity, which in aggregate is the firm’s cost of equity 
capital. Socially responsible investing may increase the cost of capital for non-SRI firms.  By 
reducing demand for these stocks, the price is depressed, which will increase the cost of equity.  
(Heinkel, Kraus, & Zechner, 2001).  If this line of reasoning is correct, then we should observe 
the opposite effect for socially responsible firms.  Higher than average demand for the stocks 
should artificially increase the price, thus lowering the cost of capital.   
 
My paper posits that the higher demand for stocks of socially responsible firms is driven 
by a lower required return on equity, due to the offsetting non-pecuniary psychological rewards 
that SRI investors receive from investing in social enterprises. 
 
It must be kept in mind, however, that socially responsible firms tend to be smaller than 
the general population of firms with outside equity investors.  The cost of equity has been shown 
to be negatively associated with the size of the firm and the level of the stock market, so any 
analysis must control for these characteristics (Archer & Faerber, 1966). 
 
III. Data 
Data were gathered via telephone surveys to founders of benefit corporations that were 
incorporated as of as of May 1, 2012.  The questions asked regarded line of business, revenues, 
demographics of the founder, and attitudes about investments and politics. 
 
The list of benefit corporations was gathered by a variety of means.  Some states posted a 
list of benefit corporations on their website, other states provided a search capability within their 
entity database, and others kept a manual list in the office of the secretary of state that was 
available upon request. 
 
The number of existent benefit corporations as of that date was ninety-two.  I randomized 
the list of firms and then I attempted to contact each founder to ask the survey questions.  The 
complete set of survey questions is provided in Appendix A.  Beyond the demographic and firm 
characteristic questions, there were three survey questions that specifically address the social 
responsibility discount in their required return on equity, as follows: 
 
 “These next few questions are not about your company specifically, they are questions 
about your perspectives generally as an investor in social enterprises.   If you had a 
choice between investing in two firms, both not evil, and identical in every way except 
that one was a benefit corporation with a social purpose that you advocate, would you 
prefer to invest in the traditional firm or the benefit corporation?” 
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 “Following on with this same investment choice, would you be willing to accept a lower 
financial return from the benefit corporation than from the traditional corporation?” 
 
 [If the answer to the previous question was ‘yes’] “So in that case, how much less of an 
annual financial return on your investment would you be willing to accept from the 
benefit corporation?  For example, if you required the traditional company to provide an 
expected annual return of 10% in order to convince you to invest in it, how much less 
would you require from the benefit corporation?” 
 
Assessing the political attitudes of the respondents presented some difficulty.  At first, I 
only asked which presidential candidate they voted for in 2008 and which they support in the 
2012 election.  When it became clear that 100% of the responses were Barack Obama, the survey 
had to be modified in order to provide some variability.  So a question was added that asked their 
opinion of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement on a Likert scale of 1 to 5.  OWS affinity is 
a reasonable proxy for the degree to which the respondent leans to the political left, particularly 
as it relates to financial markets. 
 
A significant contribution of this paper is the descriptive data that it presents about the 
founders of benefit corporations.  Since benefit corporations are a new phenomenon, relatively is 
known about these founders and their companies.  Table 1 presents the summary statistics. 
  
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics.  This table presents summary statistics of results of a 
survey conducted between May 1, 2012 and August 31, 2012 of founders/investors of 
benefit corporations. 
 
     
Variable Mean SD Min Max Median 
      Male 66% 0.48 0 1 
 White 88% 0.34 0 1 
 Asian 6% 0.25 0 1 
 Black 3% 0.18 0 1 
 Native American 3% 0.18 0 1 
 Married 56% 0.50 0 1 
 Social Resp Discount 35.3% 0.28 0% 100% 31.5% 
Age 43.7 11.3 26 63 43.5 
Occupy Wall Street 3.4 1.01 1 5 3 
Education 16.7 2.02 12 22 16 
Industry Exp 16.6 11.1 1 40 16 
Mgmt Exp 13.9 11.6 0 40 11 
Num Employees 15.8 47.9 0 260 3 
Revenue 3.4 2.4 0 10 2.5 
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IV. Results 
IV.a.  Univariate Results 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to establish an estimate for the social responsibility 
discount, or in other words, how much less of a required return on equity do social investors 
have for social enterprises in the private capital markets.  The inferences from Table I are 
dramatic.  The mean social responsibility discount is 35%.  This means that for a traditional 
investment that the social entrepreneur would require a 10% return, for example, that 
entrepreneur would only require a 6.5% return from an equivalent benefit corporation. 
 
The demographic details from the survey are also very interesting.  I find that there is 
very little racial diversity in this entity space.  88% of benefit corporation founders are white.  
About half are married.  The idea that these founders are idealistic youth is not supported by the 
data.  The median age is 43.5.  For the most part, bencorp founders voted for Obama in 2008 
(84%) and will vote for him again in 2012 (78%).  They are college-educated with about 17 
years of experience in their industry. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Voting Plans.  2012 Presidential voting plans for founders of benefit corporations,  
based on 32 survey observations. 
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Figure 4 - Education Years (Beyond High School).  Number of years of education beyond high  
school of the founders of benefit corporations, based on 32 survey observations. 
 
 
The firms themselves are quite small, with a median of three employees and 
approximately $250,000 in annual revenue.  This is to be expected, since the firms are for the 
most part, very new.  Subsequent follow-on surveys will determine their growth rate, and will be 
incorporated into future papers. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Revenue for Last Twelve Months. Firm revenue estimate for last twelve months,  
based on 32 survey observations of benefit corporations. 
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IV.b.  Multivariate Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the OLS regression analyses with the social responsibility 
discount as the dependent variable.  The full model is represented in column 1 of the table and is 
defined as follows: 
 
                            (1) 
 
where SRD is the social responsibility discount, IC are investor characteristics and FC are firm 
characteristics.  The age of the firm is negatively associated with the level of the discount and is 
significant at the 5% level.  Education is also negatively associated with the level of the discount 
– the higher the education the less willing the investor is to accept a lower return.  The strongest 
determinant of the discount appears to be gender.  Women are willing to accept a much lower 
return on equity than men are, provide the firm is a benefit corporation.  Being married, on the 
other hand, is associated with a higher discount. 
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Table 2 – Determinants of the Social Responsibility Discount. This table presents the results of ordinary 
least squares regressions where the social responsibility discount (expressed as a percentage) is the 
dependent variable.  Column (1) is the full model.  Column (2) is restricted to firm characteristics.  Column 
(3) reflects all investor characteristics.  Column (4) reflects investor demographics. Column (5) is restricted 
to investor political leanings.  Figures in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
                    
          
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
          
Has Business Started? -0.3592 
 
0.3292 
      
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.167) 
      Age of Firm -0.0245** 
 
-0.0017 
      
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.862) 
      # Shareholders 0.0042 
 
-0.0014 
      
 
(0.484) 
 
(0.813) 
      # Employees 0.0075* 
 
0.0025 
      
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.538) 
      LTM Revenue 0.0219 
 
-0.0046 
      
 
(0.486) 
 
(0.903) 
      Founder? 0.1692 
   
0.1313 
 
0.0930 
  
 
(0.284) 
   
(0.365) 
 
(0.524) 
  Age of Investor 0.0004 
   
-0.0063 
 
-0.0059 
  
 
(0.952) 
   
(0.406) 
 
(0.437) 
  Education -0.0732*** 
   
-0.0439* 
 
-0.0569** 
  
 
(0.009) 
   
(0.087) 
 
(0.028) 
  Industry Exp -0.0010 
   
-0.0001 
 
-0.0011 
  
 
(0.885) 
   
(0.989) 
 
(0.888) 
  Mgmt Exp 0.0118 
   
0.0142 
 
0.0160* 
  
 
(0.170) 
   
(0.132) 
 
(0.081) 
  Male -0.3458*** 
   
-0.1417 
 
-0.1072 
  
 
(0.010) 
   
(0.220) 
 
(0.343) 
  White 0.5148** 
   
0.2729 
 
0.3250* 
  
 
(0.019) 
   
(0.151) 
 
(0.095) 
  Asian 0.7552** 
   
0.2930 
 
0.4234 
  
 
(0.019) 
   
(0.301) 
 
(0.132) 
  Married 0.3251** 
   
0.2066** 
 
0.1582 
  
 
(0.013) 
   
(0.043) 
 
(0.110) 
  Voting for Obama -0.2656** 
   
-0.0997 
   
-0.1241 
 
(0.035) 
   
(0.423) 
   
(0.307) 
Opinion of OWS 0.0883* 
   
0.0829* 
   
0.0715 
 
(0.072) 
   
(0.093) 
   
(0.161) 
Intercept 1.0315* 
 
0.0474 
 
0.5687 
 
0.9466* 
 
0.2082 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.819) 
 
(0.326) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.277) 
          Observations 32.0000 
 
32.0000 
 
32.0000 
 
32.0000 
 
32.0000 
R
2
 0.7674 
 
0.1018 
 
0.5680 
 
0.4914 
 
0.0887 
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With respect to political attitudes, being an Obama supporter in the 2012 election appears 
to be associated with a stingier attitude toward social investing.   It should be noted, though, that 
no respondents indicated support for the Republican candidate.  The handful that are not 
supporting Obama are either voting for a third party candidate or have decided not to vote at all.  
OWS affinity, on the other hand, is associated with a greater discount and is significant at the 
10% level. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Opinion of Occupy Wall Street. Benefit corporation founder’s opinion of the Occupy Wall 
Street movement based on 32 survey observations.  This survey question is intended to measure the degree 
to which the respondent leaned to the left.  Nearly 100% were Obama voters, which did not provide enough 
variation to be able to be a proxy for political views. 
 
 
IV.c.  Limitations 
 
The most important potential implication of this study is whether the results can be 
generalized to socially responsible investment overall.  At this point in time, that may be too 
much of a stretch.  The individuals surveyed for this study were founders of benefit corporations.  
Although they are indeed investors in socially responsible enterprises, founders may exhibit 
different investment preferences than investors in SRI generally.  As these benefit corporations 
grow and attract outside investors, it will be possible to survey those new investors in order to 
tease out any founder effects. 
 
There may also be unique effects associated with benefit corporations, as compared to 
other CSR firms.  For example, benefit corporations theoretically have less recourse available to 
stockholders if the officers or directors do not maximize profit.  This lower level of shareholder 
protection could result in an increase in the required return on equity.   
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V. Conclusion 
Although informally proposed by Muhammad Yunus over two decades ago, the real-life 
implementation of benefit corporations is a very recent phenomenon.  In 2010, Maryland became 
the first state to allow firms to incorporate as this new entity type.  Nineteen other states have 
since followed by passing their own laws enabling this new kind of company. 
 
Information about these new firms is quite scarce, but is slowly emerging.  From the data 
gleaned from telephone surveys, the author of this article finds that founders of benefit 
corporations are predominantly middle-age college-educated Caucasians, who tend to lean left 
politically. 
 
This paper also finds that investors in social enterprises are willing to sacrifice return on 
equity in return for the social benefits provided to the greater community by the firm.  This 
discount in the required return on equity is estimated to be 35%.  The implications of this finding 
are quite dramatic with regard to capital markets.  If two firms are identical in every way except 
that one of them is a benefit corporation, the survey data implies is that the benefit corporation 
has a significantly lower cost of equity capital, given by equation 2, 
 
       (      )          (2) 
 
where     is the required return on benefit equity and    is the required return on external equity 
for the equivalent traditional firm.  Thus, in terms of private capital markets, there would appear 
to be a strong incentive for firms to incorporate as benefit corporations due to the potentially low 
cost of equity capital.  This phenomenon warrants further study as more data becomes available. 
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APPENDIX A – The Survey Questions 
 
Q1 What type of business are you in? 
Manufacturing (1), Retail & Consumer Services (2), Wholesale & Distribution (3), Business 
Services (4), Basic Materials & Energy (5), Health Care (6), Information Technology (7), 
Financial Services (8), Other - please specify (9) _____ 
Q2 What is the social purpose of your company? 
 
Q3 When did you incorporate as a benefit corporation?  
 
Q4 In what state did you incorporate?   
 
Q5 If your company previously incorporated before becoming a benefit corporation, when did 
the business originally incorporate? 
 
Q6 When did your company start actual business operations?  (can be a future date) 
 
Q7 Are you the founder?   Yes/No 
 
Q8 How many shareholders are there in your firm?  
Q9 These next few questions are not about your company specifically, they are questions about 
your perspectives generally as an investor in social enterprises.   If you had a choice between 
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investing in two firms, both not evil, and identical in every way except that one was a benefit 
corporation with a social purpose that you advocate, would you prefer to invest in the traditional 
firm or the benefit corporation? 
 
Q10 Following on with this same investment choice, would you be willing to accept a lower 
financial return from the benefit corporation than from the traditional corporation? 
 
Q11 [If the answer to the previous question was ‘yes’] So in that case, how much less of an 
annual financial return on your investment would you be willing to accept from the benefit 
corporation?  For example, if you required the traditional company to provide an expected 
annual return of 10% in order to convince you to invest in it, how much less would you require 
from the benefit corporation? 
 
Q12 What is your headquarters zip code.  
Q13 Is your firm currently financed by any of the following sources? (Check all that apply.) 
Personal funds (12), Friends and family (1), Credit card financing (2), Angel investors 
(3), Venture Capital Fund (4), Mezzanine Fund (subordinated or junior debt) (5), Private 
Equity Fund (6), Hedge Fund (7), Factor (8), Asset based lender, excluding factor) (9), 
Bank Loan (10), Other - please specify (11). __ 
 
Q14 How many employees does your firm have?   
 
Q15 Which of the following best categorizes the size of your annual revenues (last 12 months)? 
$0 (1) 
More than $0 but less than or equal to $100,000 (2) 
More than $100,000 but less than or equal to $250,000 (3) 
More than $250,000 but less than or equal to $500,000 (4) 
More than $500,000 but less than or equal to $1 million (5) 
More than $1 million but less than or equal to $5 million (6) 
More than $5 million but less than or equal to $10 million (7) 
More than $10 million but less than or equal to $25 million (8) 
More than $25 million but less than or equal to $50 million (9) 
More than $50 million but less than or equal to $100 million (10) 
More than $100 million but less than or equal to $500 million (11) 
Greater than $500 million (12) 
Unknown (13) 
 
Q17 In what year were you born? 
 
Q18 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 
Q19 How many years of experience do you have working in your industry? 
 
Q20 How many years of experience do you have in business management? 
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Q21 What is your Gender?  
 
Q22 What race do you identify yourself as? 
 
Q23 What is your Marital Status? 
 
Q25 In the 2012 Presidential Election, which candidate do you support?  
 
Q24 In the 2008 Presidential Election, which candidate did you support?  
 
Q26 Which political party are you registered with?  
 
Q27 What is your opinion of the Occupy Wall Street movement? 
 
1-Very Unfavorable  
2-Somewhat Unfavorable 
3-Neutral/Unknown 
4-Somewhat Favorable 
5-Very Favorable 
 
